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from $96,000 to $23,740. Approximately three-fourths of the
residuary estate would have been taken for the payment of
taxes. This result appears especially inequitable in the case
where the residuary beneficiaries are the testator's spouse
or children, who are generally the natural objects of his
bounty. Such a result is what the Uniform Act and other
apportionment statutes were meant to prevent. These statutes
are effective to this end in a situation where there is no tax
clause. However, in view of the fact that the testator is still
given the power to direct what fund will pay the tax, these
statutes may be foiled by unclear tax clauses. The clause
considered in the principle case was admittedly such a clause.2"
It is important that one drawing up a will consult an attorney;
but it is even more important that the attorney advise his
client as to the tax consequences involved in the disposition
of the client's property at death. In order to protect adequately his client, an attorney should be able to draw up a clear and
comprehensive tax clause concerning the entire estate, testamentary and non-testamentary, to the end that his client's
wishes will not be subject to defeat 'due to unclear or inadequate information in the tax clause.
R. MICHAEL MULLIKIN

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Waiver of Governmental Immunity -

Defec-

tive Traffic Control Devices. Fanning v. City of Laramie, 402 P.2d 460
(Wyo.

1965).

Plaintiff's son was killed at an intersection of a through
street. In a suit against the City of Laramie, it was alleged
that the proximate cause of the accident was due to the city's
failure to remove limbs and foliage of trees which obscured
a stop sign and thereby created a condition dangerous to
motorists. The complaint was dismissed by the trial court on
the grounds that the city possessed governmental immunity
from suit. Upon appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court held
82. In re Ogburn's Estate, supra note 2, at 658.
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that the city's usual governmental immunity from suit had

been waived,' and remanded the action for trial.
When determining the tort liability of a municipal corporation, state and federal courts in the United States usually
apply the governmental-proprietary test. Generally, this
means that torts which arise out of a city's governmental
functions will not create liability, while torts which arise out
of a city's proprietary or corporate functions will create
liability.2
It is obvious that, as far as the users of the streets and
highways are concerned, the obligation to construct and maintain streets is public in nature with no accompanying profit
or benefit to a city.' Thus, it would seem that construction
and maintenance of a street is a purely governmental function, the negligent performance of which would be exempt
from tort liability. Streets and highways, however, have
always received treatment that is separate from the usual
rules of governmental immunity."
The necessity for this separate treatment has never been
adequately explained, but can be attributed to the historical
development of control and maintenance of streets and highways.
During the early periods of English history, highways
were laid out, constructed and managed solely by the government. These activities were recognized as typical governmental functions.5 In this country, control over highways
is also considered a state duty, but it is a duty which is not
exclusive and can be delegated. The practice of delegating
this duty to municipal corporations and other government
entities soon developed, and was accompanied by the inevitable lawsuits which arose from a failure to perform adequately that duty. Two separate theories arose with which
courts held municipalities liable for injuries resulting from
inadequate conditions in their streets.
1. Fanning v. City of Laramie, 402 P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1965).
2. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 29.6, at 1619 (1956). This seemingly simple
rule has been subject to much confusion and misapplication by the courts,
so that the law of municipal immunity exists in a morass of uncertainty.
3. 19 McQUILLX, MUNICIPAL CORTORATIONS § 54.03 (3d ed. 1950).
4. 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1624, § 29.7, at 1627.
6. 10 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 30.89 (Sd ed. 1950).
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The first theory is that cities should be held liable for a
failure to keep their streets free from dangerous defects and
obstructions.' The basis of the liability has been called an
illogical exception to the general rule that cities are not responsible for negligent performance of governmental 'duties."
This illogical exception has been implemented by the
courts under the following rationales: (1) that the maintenance of streets from dangerous defects and obstructions was
a corporate or ministerial function;8 (2) that statutes had
expressly imposed liability on a city for allowing the existence
of dangerous defects or obstructions in its streets;' or (3)
that the failure of maintaining streets free from defects and
obstructions was an exception to the general rule of governmental immunity."
The element which is common to all three rationales and
which determines their applicability is the term "defects or
obstructions." Before liability can be waived, there must be
a determination that the particular hazard in question comes
within the definition of defects and obstructions. The typical
approach has been that this term includes only actual imperfections or obstructions in the street itself." Defective
traffic control devices, in most instances, have not been included within the usual definition. 2 Such devices have been
viewed as essential adjuncts to the regulation of traffic, which,
by the majority view, is considered to be a truly governmental
function under the police power of the state." "We think
that the distinction between the failure of a city to keep its
streets in a safe condition as regards physical defects therein
6. 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 2, § 29.7; 19 MCQUILUN, op. cit. supra
note 3, §§ 54.01, 54.02, 54.03; RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW § 30-14 (1957);
Dorminey v. Montgomery, 232 Ala. 47, 166 So. 689 (1936); Hagerman v.
City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 66 P.2d 1152, 110 A.L.R. 1110 (1937).
7. 19 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 54.08.
8. Missano v. City of New York, 160 N.Y. 123, 54 N.E. 744 (1899).
9. Belhumuer v. City of Bristol, 121 Conn. 475, 185 Atl. 421 (1936).
10. Wilson v. City of Laramie, 65 Wyo. 234, 199 P.2d 119 (1948).
11. Blaschke v. City of Watertown, 226 Wis. 1, 275 N.W. 528 (1937) (wagon
tipped over when its wheels dropped into ruts, injuring plaintiff). Optiz
v. City of Town of Newcastle, 35 Wyo. 358, 249 Pac. 799 (1926) (plaintiff
injured when car dropped through bridge undergoing repairs).
12. Martin v. City of Canton, 41 Ohio App. 420, 180 N.E. 78 (1931) ; Carruthers
v. City of St. Louis, 341 Mo. 1073, 111 S.W.2d 32 (1937).
13. RHYNE, OP. cit. supra note 6, § 18-21, at 431, § 30-17, at 759; PROSSER,
TORTS § 125, at 1008 (3d ed. 1964); Dorminey v. Montgomery, supra note
6; Avey v. City of West Palm Beach, 152 Fla. 717, 12 So. 2d 881 (1943);
Auslander v. City of St. Louis 332 Mo. 145, 56 S.W.2d 778 (1932).
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and the failure or neglect in regulating traffic thereon is clear
and definite.""
Nevertheless, a minority of the jurisdictions have classified defective traffic control devices as typical unsafe conditions or defects of streets, and have imposed liability.'"
The second theory courts have employed to escape governmental immunity is somewhat unique. If a function is
governmental, it generally does not matter whether the performance by the municipality is undertaken voluntarily or
under legislative imposition; the city would still be considered
a governmental agency acting in behalf of the sovereign, and
would still be entitled to the freedom from liability enjoyed
by the state itself."6 Some states, however, have adopted the
theory that a duty to perform a governmental function imposed by17 the legislature upon a city may be the basis of
liability.
In Phinney v. City of Seattle'" the Washington Supreme
Court held that, although regulation of traffic was a governmental function, the city is still liable for a failure to
maintain adequately a stop sign. The decision was based
neither upon a statute which expressly waived the usual immunity, nor upon one of the rationales for defective conditions of streets. It merely stated, I[E]ven though the function
14.
15.

16.

17.
18.

Tolliver v. City of Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 521, 62 N.E.2d 357, 361, 161
A.L.R. 1891, 1897 (1945).
Maintenance of traffic control devices is a governmental function, but
it is included within the duty to maintain streets in a safe condition. Johnston v. City of East Moline, 338 Ill. App. 220, 87 N.E.2d 22 (1949).
"[O]nce a municipality has decided to exercise the discretion vested in it
to declare one street a through street and erect a stop sign . . . the sign
becomes an important part of the physical appurtenances of the street."
O'Hare v. City of Detroit, 262 Mich. 19, 21, 106 N.W.2d 538, 540 (1960).
In California defective traffic control devices came within the scope
of a statute which created liability for the existence of dangerous or
defective public property. Irvin v. Padelford, 127 Cal. App. 2d 135, 273
P.2d 539 (1954).
City of Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 292, 156 N.E. 210, 211, 52
A.L.R. 518, 521 (1927). The distinction has been made between statutes
that impose governmental duties and those that impose proprietary duties.
In the former no liability generally attaches: in the latter there can be
liability. Another distinction has been made that if the duty was placed upon
the city by a command of the legislature so that no discretion in how or
when to act was present, liability would attach. The difficulty under any
theory is that without an express waiver present in the statute, any waiver
found by the court can come only by implication.
Lyle v. Fiorito, 187 Wash. 537, 60 P.2d 709 (1936); Phinney v. City of
Seattle, 34 Wash. 2d 330, 208 P.2d 879 (1949).
Phinney v. City of Seattle, supra note 17.
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may be governmental in character if the statute commands
performance by the city and such command is disobeyed the
the resultant damages to injured users of
city is liable for
9
the highways."
In the principal case, Fanning v. City of Laramie, the
court's holding is not entirely clear; but it appears the court
first recognized the plaintiff's contentions that although the
erection of a stop sign by the city was a governmental function, there could be exceptions to the general rule of immunity
from liability afforded governmental functions. In this
regard, the court cited Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne" where
it had previously recognized, in dicta, that liability for inadequate maintenance of streets and highways was an exception to the general rule of immunity enjoyed by governmental functions.2 ' By recognizing this exception, the court
apparently classified the obscured stop sign as a typical unsafe
defect in a street and apparently accepted the minority view
that traffic regulation is not a governmental function separate
and distinct from maintenance of streets.
The court also stated that governmental nimimity may
be modified or abrogated by statute and noted several Wyoming statutes which granted a city possession and control
over its streets.2" It cited a Wyoming statute23 which imposed
19. Phinney v. City of Seattle, supra note 17, 208 P.2d at 882.
20. Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710, 42 A.L.R. 245
(1925). This was the first recognition by Wyoming that there were
exceptions to the general rules of immunity for governmental functions.
The court held the City of Cheyenne liable to suit for the death of a child
due to the negligent maintenance of a swing on a public playground. It is
evident that the reference to an exception for inadequate maintenance of
streets was dicta in that case. The court later applied this exception in
Optiz v. City of Town of Newcastle, supra note 11.
21. Fanning v. City of Laramie, supra note 1, at 463.
22. Wyo. Laws 1884, ch. 57, § 20, as amended, Wyo. Laws 1886, eh. 14, § 4;
ch. 95, §§ 4-7; Wyo. Stat. § 15-686 (1957); repealed and deleted, Wyo.
Laws 1965, ch. 112, § 491. This statute empowered the city to open and
improve its avenues, control their use and to prevent and remove all encroachments into or thereon. Wyo. Laws 1923, ch. 74, § 68; Wyo. Stat.
§ 15-337 (1957) (now Wyo. Stat. § 15.1-269 (Comp. 1965) ). This statute
empowered a city, through its manager, to supervise and control its streets
and highways.
23. Wyo. Laws 1923, ch. 74, § 73; Wyo. Stat. § 15-342 (1957) (now Wyo.
Stat. § 15.1-274 (Comp. 1965) ): "All persons who shall by means of any
excavations in, or obstructions upon any street of said city, not authorized
by law or the ordinance of said city, render such streets unsafe for travel,
or shall by negligence in the management of any such excavation or
obstruction as shall be authorized, or by failure to maintain proper guards
or lights thereat, render such street insufficient or unsafe for travel, shall
be liable for all damages recovered by the party injured . .
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liability on all persons2 4 who rendered a street unsafe for
travel by unauthorized obstructions and which authorized
the joining of a city as a party defendant. It then concluded
that these statutory provisions taken in the light of several
Wyoming decisions" gave legislative recognition that a city
acting in its governmental capacity is now without immunity
in an instance of defective traffic control devices.26 Therefore,
it would appear the court placed the usually immune regulation of traffic within a statute which imposed liability for
defective streets.
The court further added that statutes had granted the
city control over streets within its boundaries and had granted
the right to place stop signs thereon.2 7 The court stated that
once a city has decided to act under the foregoing statutes,
any traffic control devices erected must conform to Wyoming's Manual for Uniform System of Traffic Control
Devices.2" This manual requires that all stop signs be maintained so as to insure their visibility. This the court stated,
placed an imperative duty upon the city. This duty was
ordained by the legislature, and the usual governmental immunity was thereby impliedly waived.2 9 When the court
applied this doctrine, it expressly accepted and cited the
rationale formulated by the decision of Phinney v. City of
Seattle."
The court noted in conclusion that the rule of governmental immunity as declared by previous Wyoming decisions
was still the law to which it adhered, but this did not require
that the court should fail to recognize an exception to the
usual rule. It was the court's opinion that the waiver of
immunity recognized in this case was justified by statutory
and authorized highway regulations and direcenactments
81
tives.
24. The court did not expressly decide whether a municipal corporation was
within the definition of "person" for purposes of the statute.
25. Optiz v. City of Town of Newcastle, supra note 11; Wilson v. City of
Laramie, supra note 10.
26. Fanning v. City of Laramie, supra note 1.
27. Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-86(a), (c), -137, -145 (1957).
28. Wyo. Stat. § 31-137 (1957) requires that any devices erected must conform to the state manual.
29. Fanning v. City of Laramie, supra note 1, at 467.
30. Phinney v. City of Seattle, supra note 17.
31. Fanning v. City of Laramie, supra note 1, at 467.
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A possible conclusion to be drawn from the Fanning case
is that it constitutes a material "departure from Wyoming's
usual rules of governmental immunity. Such a conclusion,
however, is not entirely justified. Even though the decision
accepted a minority viewpoint in regard to traffic regulation,
there was sufficient authority from other jurisdictions to
justify a waiver on the exception theory or upon the statute
theory. It should be noted that the Wyoming court had already recognized in Optiz v. City of Town of Newcastle"
that a city could be held liable for defects in its streets. In
that case the court applied the exception theory it had previously noted in dicta in the Rainirez case" and held the city
liable for allowing the existence of a defective bridge. Thus,
when the court classified defective traffic control devices as
typical defects of streets, it brought Fanning squarely within
the scope of the Optiz decision.
Furthermore the Fanning opinion did not state whether
immunity had been waived because of the exception theory,
the statute theory or upon the rationale of the Phinney decision. It merely discussed all three. Therefore, it is possible
that the court relied upon the cumulative effect of the rationales and not upon their individual application. If this
is true, the future impact of the decision on governmental
immunity will not be great. The decision should have an
appreciable impact in other areas of governmental immunity
only if the Phinney doctrine can be removed as a separate
and sufficient basis for a waiver of immunity. Under this
doctrine the immunity of any governmental function will be
waived when the legislature has commanded that a city perform the function and there is a failure to perform it
properly. 4
It is doubtful, however, that Phinney can be divorced
from the context of street and highway defects. 5 Since the
court stated that it still recognized its long-standing position
on governmental immunity, it probably will not allow the doc32. Optiz v. City of Town of Newcastle, supra note 11.
33. Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, supra note 20.
34. As an example of the possible application of the Phinney doctrine, of. Wyo.
Stat. §§ 35-449, -450 (1957) with the statutes involved in the principal case.
It should be noted that the facts of the Phinney case were identical to the
35. Fanning
case, i.e., inadequate maintenance of stop sign.
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trine to go beyond the specialized area of streets and highways. It is not likely the court intentionally advanced a new
theory with which to waive governmental immunity. The
better explanation is that the court believed a waiver of immunity would yield a more equitable result and considered
itself justified when it was able to find three rationales upon
which to base the decision.
It would appear, therefore, that the real significance
of Fanninglies only in the area of traffic regulation. Henceforth, cities will be liable to suit for any injuries caused
because of defective traffic control devices. It seems quite
evident that in addition to obscured stop signs, other defective
traffic control devices will fall within the definition of defects
in streets, and will be encompassed by the Phinney doctrine
if they fail to meet the specifications and requirements of the
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.
JOHN D. TROUGHTON
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